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I. INTRODUCTION 
Among those who laud its mission, it seems that the only people not 
disappointed in Batson are those who never expected it to work in the first 
place. Scholars, judges, and practitioners have criticized the decision for its 
failure to curb the role of racial stereotypes in jury selection.1 Likewise, 
previous research in North Carolina has suggested both that race continues 
to play a role in jury selection and that courts are reluctant to enforce Batson 
rigorously.2 Recently, however, the North Carolina General Assembly passed 
legislation aimed at curing this defect by providing trial courts a unique 
opportunity to consider the role of race in peremptory challenges from a 
different angle. 
The North Carolina Racial Justice Act of 2009 (“RJA”) created a state 
claim for relief for defendants currently on death row who can show that 
race was a significant factor in the exercise of peremptory challenges in their 
cases.3 A defendant who makes such a showing is entitled to have a death 
sentence reduced to life without parole.4 The RJA expressly deems a broad 
range of evidence relevant by allowing claimants to prove their cases using 
“statistical evidence or other evidence, including, but not limited to, sworn 
testimony of attorneys, prosecutors, law enforcement officers, jurors, or 
other members of the criminal justice system or both.”5 This Article presents 
the results of a study undertaken in order to evaluate the potential for 
statistical evidence to support claims under this part of the RJA. 
In particular, we examined how prosecutors exercised peremptory 
challenges in capital trials of all defendants on death row in North Carolina 
as of July 1, 2010, to assess whether potential jurors’ race played any role in 
those decisions.6 We found substantial disparities in which potential jurors 
prosecutors struck. Over the twenty-year period we examined, prosecutors 
struck eligible black venire members at about 2.5 times the rate they struck 
eligible venire members who were not black. These disparities remained 
consistent over time and across the state, and did not diminish when we 
 
 1. See infra notes 19–21 and accompanying text. 
 2. See Amanda S. Hitchcock, Recent Development, “Deference Does Not by Definition Preclude 
Relief”: The Impact of Miller-El v. Dretke on Batson Review in North Carolina Capital Appeals, 84 
N.C. L. REV. 1328 (2006) (reviewing North Carolina Supreme Court’s highly deferential 
approach to reviewing Batson claims in capital cases); Mary R. Rose, The Peremptory Challenge 
Accused of Race or Gender Discrimination? Some Data from One County, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 695 
(1999) (studying jury selection in one North Carolina county). 
 3. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-2010–12 (2011) (creating a cause of action if the court 
finds race was a significant factor in the prosecutor’s decision to seek or impose a death 
sentence).  
 4. Id. § 15A-2012(a)(3). 
 5. Id. § 15A-2011(b). 
 6. A list of current death row inmates is available at http://www.doc.state.nc.us/ 
dop/deathpenalty/deathrow.htm. 
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controlled for information about venire members that potentially bore on 
the decision to strike them, such as views on the death penalty or prior 
experience with crime.7 
In Part II, we review the prior research on jury selection, particularly on 
the issue of racial bias. In Part III, we present our study methodology and 
design. Part IV presents the statewide unadjusted racial disparities in 
prosecutors’ exercise of peremptory strikes, and Part V presents the results 
of analyses controlling for other factors potentially relevant to jury selection. 
II. THE STUBBORN LEGACY OF RACE IN JURY SELECTION: THE RULES AND THE 
REALITY 
The Supreme Court has grappled with barriers to racial diversity in 
juries for decades.8 Indeed, even while characterizing the peremptory 
challenge as a tool vital to the accused, the Swain v. Alabama Court held that 
a prosecutor’s systematic exclusion of black jurors was “at war with our basic 
concepts of a democratic society and a representative government.”9 Jurors, 
the Court asserted, “should be selected as individuals, on the basis of 
individual qualifications, and not as members of a race.”10 The Court 
elaborated this view in Batson v. Kentucky, when it noted that purposefully 
excluding people from jury service based on their race undermines public 
confidence in our justice system.11 The Court later clarified that excluding 
jurors because of their race harmed not only the defendant, but the wrongly 
excluded jurors as well,12 and that defense counsel must abide by the same 
rules as prosecutors.13 The Court has extended the doctrine to prohibit 
gender-based strikes,14 and some lower courts have prohibited strikes based 
on religious affiliation.15 
While the Court established an elaborate three-step process for 
challenging a peremptory challenge as based on race (or gender), parties 
 
 7. Please see Part III.E and Appendix A for more information on this coding. 
 8. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); 
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (juries exist “to guard against the exercise of 
arbitrary power”); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942) (juries must not be “the 
organ of any special group or class”), superseded on other grounds by rule, FED. R. EVID. 104(a), as 
recognized in Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). 
 9. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 204 (1965) (quoting Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 
130 (1940)) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 
(1986). 
 10. Id. (quoting Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286 (1950)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 11. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87. 
 12. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 425 (1991). 
 13. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992). 
 14. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
 15. United States v. Brown, 352 F.3d 654 (2d Cir. 2003); Andrew D. Leipold, 
Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal Cases: A Critical Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. 945 (1998). 
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can readily defeat the challenge by proffering a plausible race-neutral reason 
for the strike decision.16 Trial courts rarely reject these explanations (in the 
third step) as disingenuous, or “pretextual.”17 Moreover, the Court designed 
the Batson regime to counter intentional discrimination. Significant 
psychological research suggests that racial bias can operate below the level of 
conscious awareness to affect people’s perceptions and behaviors.18 As a 
result, a party who is subconsciously influenced by a juror’s race might offer 
in good faith a race-neutral reason for the strike. Batson’s focus on the 
credibility rather than reasonableness of the proffered explanation 
authorizes trial courts to uphold such strikes even though they may be 
actually (if unintentionally) driven by race. 
The difficulty of uncovering racial bias—whether deliberate or 
unconscious—has led many to conclude that the Batson regime cannot 
counter discrimination in jury selection.19 Many scholars and several judges 
have called for the wholesale abolition of peremptory challenges.20 Others 
have suggested less drastic reforms, such as reducing the number of 
peremptories available to each side, so as to limit the opportunity for race-
 
 16. In the first stage, the defendant carries the burden of establishing a prima facie case. 
In the second, the prosecution carries a burden of producing a race-neutral explanation for the 
strike or strikes. Finally, in the third stage, the defendant carries the burden of proving that the 
explanations offered by the prosecution with respect to one or more venire members were 
pretextual, thereby supporting an inference that one or more was racially motivated. Batson, 
476 U.S. at 96–98. 
 17. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 278 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Kenneth J. 
Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 483–84 (1996). 
 18. Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 357, 357–411 (Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske & Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 
1998); Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (1989). 
 19. Batson, 476 U.S. at 102–08 (Marshall, J., concurring); Edward S. Adams & Christian J. 
Lane, Constructing a Jury That Is Both Impartial and Representative: Utilizing Cumulative Voting in Jury 
Selection, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703, 706–07 (1998); Leonard L. Cavise, The Batson Doctrine: The 
Supreme Court’s Utter Failure To Meet the Challenge of Discrimination in Jury Selection, 1999 WIS. L. 
REV. 501; Sheri Lynn Johnson, Batson Ethics for Prosecutors and Trial Court Judges, 73 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 475 (1998); Deborah Ramirez, Affirmative Jury Selection: A Proposal To Advance Both the 
Deliberative Ideal and Jury Diversity, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 161, 173–74. 
 20. Batson, 476 U.S. at 102–08 (Marshall, J., concurring); Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme 
Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
153, 199–211 (1989); William G. Childs, The Intersection of Peremptory Challenges, Challenges for 
Cause, and Harmless Error, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 49 (1999); Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges 
Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge’s Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 809 n.2 (1997) (listing and 
citing judges and academics who have voiced strong concerns about peremptory challenges); 
Vivien Toomey Montz & Craig Lee Montz, The Peremptory Challenge: Should It Still Exist? An 
Examination of Federal and Florida Law, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 451 (2000); Arielle Siebert, Batson v. 
Kentucky: Application to Whites and the Effect on the Peremptory Challenge System, 32 COLUM. J.L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 307 (1999). 
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based jury selection.21 The RJA adopts none of these policy 
recommendations. Rather, it authorizes a new approach to examining the 
role of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges based on a broad 
range of evidence. 
As noted earlier, the RJA created a state statutory claim for defendants 
facing a death sentence who can show that race was a significant factor in 
the exercise of peremptory challenges “in the county, the prosecutorial 
district, the judicial division, or the State at the time the death sentence was 
sought or imposed.”22 The geographical scope of a potential claim makes it 
distinct from a typical Batson claim as does the range of evidence expressly 
authorized. Claimants may prove their cases using “statistical evidence or 
other evidence, including, but not limited to, sworn testimony of attorneys, 
prosecutors, law enforcement officers, jurors, or other members of the 
criminal justice system or both.”23 
This Article presents evidence relevant to a claim under the RJA. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that race weighs heavily in decisions to exercise 
peremptory strikes24—a conclusion bolstered by systematic research. 
Previous research on jury selection generally, and the role of race in the 
exercise of peremptory studies more specifically, typically evaluates different 
aspects of Batson’s legal framework. While this framework does not apply 
directly to an RJA claim, the central question remains constant: Did race 
play a significant role in the exercise of peremptory challenges? 
A. EXPERIMENTAL AND MOCK-JURY STUDIES 
Experimental and other laboratory work with mock jurors lends support 
to those who suspect that race continues to play a role in jury selection.25 For 
example, a number of studies conducted before the Batson Court prohibited 
consideration of race in jury selection demonstrated its importance in 
decision making. George Hayden, Joseph Senna, and Larry Seigel examined 
the types of information relevant to prosecutorial decision making in voir 
dire among twenty randomly selected prosecutors from four Boston-area 
 
 21. Adams & Lane, supra note 19; Amy Wilson, The End of Peremptory Challenges: A Call for 
Change Through Comparative Analysis, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 363 (2009). 
 22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2011(a) (2011). 
 23. Id. § 15A-2011(b). 
 24. In a 1986 training video, Philadelphia District Attorney Jack McMahon emphasized 
the importance of striking certain black venire members, such as “blacks from low-income 
areas” and blacks who are “real educated.” Videotape: Jury Selection with Jack McMahon 
(DATV Prods. 1987), available at http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-51028349729 
75877286, cited in David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: 
A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 41–43 (2001). 
 25. Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race and Jury Selection: Psychological 
Perspectives on the Peremptory Challenge Debate, 63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 527, 533 (2008). 
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counties.26 The researchers presented the prosecutors with categories of 
information about potential jurors for two hypothetical cases, one involving 
a black defendant and the other a white defendant.27 Prosecutors could seek 
information about potential jurors from one category at a time, and then 
decide whether to strike the juror or to seek more information.28 
Prosecutors typically sought information about potential jurors’ gender, age, 
residence, occupation, demeanor, and appearance.29 In the case involving 
the black defendant, however, prosecutors sought information on race of 
the venire member significantly more often than they did in the case 
involving the white defendant.30 
More recently, Michael Norton and Samuel Sommers presented three 
groups of study participants—college students, law students, and trial 
attorneys—with the facts of a criminal case involving a black defendant.31 
The researchers told participants to assume the role of the prosecutor, and 
that they had only one peremptory strike left to use in deciding which of two 
prospective jurors to strike.32 The prospective jurors each had qualities that 
pretesting suggested would be troubling to prosecutors: one was a journalist 
who had investigated police misconduct and the other had indicated 
skepticism about statistics relevant to forensic evidence that the state would 
offer.33 Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: one in 
which the first prospective juror was black and the second white, and 
another in which the race of the prospective jurors was reversed.34 
Participants challenged the black juror more often than the white juror, 
regardless of whether the juror was presented as the journalist or the 
statistics skeptic.35 Yet, when asked to explain why they struck the juror they 
did, the study participants almost never mentioned race; participants tended 
to offer the first juror’s experience writing about police misconduct when 
 
 26. George Hayden, Joseph Senna & Larry Siegel, Prosecutorial Discretion in Peremptory 
Challenges: An Empirical Investigation of Information Use in the Massachusetts Jury Selection Process, 13 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 768 (1978). 
 27. Id. at 781–82. 
 28. Id. at 782–83. 
 29. Id. at 784–85, 784–85 tbl.II. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race-Neutral 
Justifications: Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge Procedure, 31 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 261, 266 (2007). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 265–66. 
 34. Id. at 266–67. 
 35. Id. at 267, 267 tbl.I. The effect was statistically significant for college (n = 90) and law 
students (n = 81) (p < .05), and marginally significant in the smaller attorney sample (n = 28). 
Id. at 266–67. 
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striking him, and cited the second juror’s skepticism about statistics when 
striking him.36 
In another study, Norbert Kerr and colleagues had attorneys view 
videotaped voir dire of mock jurors in a criminal case, and assigned each the 
role of judge, defense attorney, or prosecutor—usually based on their 
current position or past experience in the respective role.37 They asked 
participants to rate the desirability of the potential jurors and to indicate 
which ones they would strike.38 The researchers found that attorneys 
assigned the role of prosecutor were far more likely to strike black 
prospective jurors than jurors of another race.39 
Studies that examine jury selection in hypothetical settings are limited 
by the artificial nature of the decision making.40 Their strength, however, is 
that they allow researchers greater control over the variables in question in 
order to identify causal factors. These studies offer substantial evidence that 
race plays a significant role in jury selection, especially when considered in 
light of the research on jury selection in real trials set forth below.41 
B. STUDIES EXAMINING JURY SELECTION IN ACTUAL TRIALS 
Only a handful of published studies have examined how parties exercise 
peremptory challenges in actual trials. In one study, Billy Turner and 
colleagues examined strikes by both the prosecution and defense in 121 
criminal trials in one Louisiana parish from 1976–1981.42 The authors 
compared the percentage of struck jurors who were black (44%) to the 
percent of the population in the Louisiana parish that was black at the time 
of the study (18%), and inferred from this twenty-six-point disparity that jury 
selection was not race neutral.43 
John Clark and colleagues analyzed jury selection in twenty-eight trials 
in two adjacent counties in a southeastern state.44 Across the eleven criminal 
 
 36. Id. at 267–68. 
 37. Norbert L. Kerr, Geoffrey P. Kramer, John S. Carroll & James J. Alfini, On the 
Effectiveness of Voir Dire in Criminal Cases with Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity: An Empirical Study, 40 
AM. U. L. REV. 665, 676 (1991). 
 38. Id. at 677–78. 
 39. Id. at 692. 
 40. See Sommers & Norton, supra note 31, at 270–71 (noting limitations of experimental 
jury-selection studies). 
 41. See id. at 270 (noting convergence of experimental and archival data analysis of the 
effect of race in jury selection). 
 42. Billy M. Turner, Rickie D. Lovell, John C. Young & William F. Denny, Race and 
Peremptory Challenges During Voir Dire: Do Prosecution and Defense Agree?, 14 J. CRIM. JUST. 61, 63 
(1986). 
 43. Id. 
 44. John Clark, Marcus T. Boccaccini, Beth Caillouet & William F. Chaplin, Five Factor 
Model Personality Traits, Jury Selection, and Case Outcomes in Criminal and Civil Cases, 34 CRIM. JUST. 
& BEHAV. 641, 647 (2007). 
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trials they examined, race was a statistically significant predictor of both 
prosecution and defense strikes, but in reverse patterns: the state struck 
disproportionally more black potential jurors while the defense struck 
disproportionally fewer.45 
Mary Rose examined peremptory strike decisions in thirteen non-
capital felony trials in North Carolina.46 Prosecutors used 60% of their 
strikes against black jurors, who constituted only 32% of the venire.47 In 
comparison, defense attorneys used 87% of their strikes against white jurors, 
who made up 68% of the venire.48 
A third study conducted by Richard Bourke and Joe Hingston at the 
Louisiana Crisis Assistance center examined jury selection in 390 jury trials 
involving 13,662 prospective jurors in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana.49 In both 
six- and twelve-person juries, prosecutors struck “black prospective jurors at 
more than three times the rate” they struck their white counterparts.50 
David Baldus and colleagues examined strike decisions over a 
seventeen-year period in 317 Philadelphia County capital murder trials.51 
They found that prosecutors struck on average 51% of the black jurors they 
had the opportunity to strike, compared to only 26% of comparable non-
black jurors.52 Defense strikes exhibited a nearly identical pattern in reverse: 
defense counsel struck only 26% of the black jurors they had the 
opportunity to strike, compared to 54% of comparable non-black jurors.53 
The disparate effect of race on jury selection held even when the researchers 
controlled for various non-racial characteristics of the jurors, such as age, 
occupation, education, and responses to certain questions asked in voir 
dire.54 
Journalists at the Dallas Morning News replicated the methodology of the 
Philadelphia study to examine the exercise of peremptory challenges in 108 
of 381 non-capital felony trials in Dallas County, Texas, during the first ten 
months of 2002.55 Like Baldus and colleagues, the journalists considered in 
 
 45. Id. at 651. 
 46. Rose, supra note 2, at 697. 
 47. Id. at 698–99. 
 48. Id. 
 49. RICHARD BOURKE & JOE HINGSTON, BLACK STRIKES: A STUDY OF THE RACIALLY 
DISPARATE USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES BY THE JEFFERSON PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S 
OFFICE 5 (2003). 
 50. Id. at 7–8. 
 51. David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal 
and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 10 (2001). 
 52. Id. at 53. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 70–72. 
 55. Steve McGonigle et al., A Process of Juror Elimination: Dallas Prosecutors Say They Don’t 
Discriminate, but Analysis Shows They Are More Likely To Reject Black Jurors, DALL. MORNING NEWS, 
Aug. 21, 2005, at 1A [hereinafter A Process of Juror Elimination], available at 2005 WLNR 
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the analyses the impact of non-racial characteristics of potential jurors.56 The 
Dallas Morning News study found that prosecutors “excluded eligible blacks 
from juries at more than twice the rate they rejected eligible whites.”57 The 
disparate effect of race on jury selection held even when they controlled for 
non-racial characteristics of the jurors. The journalists concluded that 
“being black was the most important personal trait affecting which jurors 
prosecutors rejected.”58 
A major strength of the Philadelphia and Dallas County studies was the 
inclusion of race-neutral factors about jurors that might bear on a party’s 
decision to strike.59 One possible explanation for racial disparities in strike 
rates is that race is associated with other race-neutral factors that drive strike 
decisions. If members of one race are disproportionately less supportive of 
the death penalty, for example, prosecutors’ disproportionately high strike 
rates against that group may be driven by group members’ views rather than 
their race. Controlling for various race-neutral factors that may bear on the 
decision to strike allows the researcher to rule out at least some alternative 
explanations of racial disparities. 
C. STUDIES ANALYZING APPELLATE DECISIONS REVIEWING BATSON CLAIMS 
We are aware of no study directly assessing Batson’s effectiveness in 
countering consideration of race in jury selection, such as by comparing 
strike rates against black jurors in trials before Batson was decided to those 
that came after. However, the consistency of researchers’ findings of racial 
disparities in studies spanning several decades suggests that Batson has not 
 
24658335 (presenting part of the findings of the study). The Dallas Morning News published the 
results of this research in a set of feature stories between Sunday, August 21 and Tuesday, 
August 23. See About the Series, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Aug. 21, 2005, at 19A, available at 2005 
WLNR 24658085 (describing the series); How the Analysis Was Done, DALL. MORNING NEWS, 
Aug. 21, 2005, at 19A, available at 2005 WLNR 2457224 (reporting study design and 
methodology). The Dallas Morning News published a similar study on jury selection in Dallas 
County in 1986. See Steve McGonigle & Ed Timms, Race Bias Pervades Jury Selection, DALL. 
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 9, 1986, at 1A, available at 1986 WLNR 1683009. This study analyzed the 
impact of peremptory strikes on jury composition in “100 randomly selected felony” jury trials 
in 1983 and 1984 and found blacks largely excluded from jury service. Id. We are aware of one 
other study on peremptory challenges by journalists. This study reached similar results. Douglas 
Frantz, Many Blacks Kept Off Juries Here, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 5, 1984, at 1 (reporting on jury 
selection for all 31 criminal jury trials in Cook County Circuit Courts in July 1984). 
 56. A Process of Juror Elimination, supra note 55. The journalists consulted with David Baldus 
and George Woodworth, the principle authors of the Philadelphia study, in conducting this 
research. Id. 
 57. Id.; see also Steve McGonigle et al., Jurors’ Race a Focal Point for Defense: Rival Lawyers 
Reject Whites at Higher Rates, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Aug. 22, 2005, at 1A, available at 2005 WLNR 
24659140 (presenting findings with respect to jury selection by defense attorneys). 
 58. A Process of Juror Elimination, supra note 55. 
 59. Baldus et al., supra note 51, at 65–72, tbls.6 & 7. 
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been especially successful in purging consideration of race from jury 
selection. 
One possible reason Batson has been so ineffective is the ease with 
which parties can generate race-neutral explanations for challenged strike 
decisions. Research on the exercise of Batson challenges indicates that courts 
commonly accept reasons proffered to justify challenged strikes based on 
little more than stereotyping and guesswork.60 Kenneth Melilli analyzed all 
published Batson decisions from 1986 to 1993, and concluded that 
proffered explanations were often grounded in stereotypes and, to a lesser 
degree, attorneys’ intuition about favorability of a potential juror.61 A second 
similar study concluded that the reasons courts often find acceptable may 
merely obfuscate race discrimination. Jeffrey Beilin and Junichi Semitsu 
surveyed all published and unpublished federal decisions from 2000 to 2009 
that reviewed state or federal trial courts’ denials of Batson challenges.62 
After reviewing decisions in 269 cases, they reported that their “most 
revealing discovery was the substantial list of acceptable reasons that could 
conceivably implicate a juror’s likelihood of being impartial but were likely 
to disproportionately impact specific racial or ethnic groups.”63 
Two papers examining the implementation of Batson in North Carolina 
concluded that the significant deference the North Carolina Supreme Court 
gives to trial courts weakened Batson’s impact in that state.64 The first paper 
evaluated the first five years of Batson appeals in North Carolina and found 
that “[n]either the North Carolina Supreme Court nor the North Carolina 
Court of Appeals ever ha[d] held for a defendant on the merits of a Batson 
claim.”65 In particular, the paper documents the court’s almost complete 
 
 60. See Melilli, supra note 17, at 484–502; see also Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, 
Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More than the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative 
Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1116–20 (2011). We are aware of one other study of 
appellate opinions concerning Batson challenges. This study noted that most litigants lose 
Batson appeals and that most of the venire members reviewed in Batson challenges were black. 
Shaun L. Gabbidon et al., Race-Based Peremptory Challenges: An Empirical Analysis of Litigation from 
the U.S. Court of Appeals, 2002–2006, 33 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 59 (2008). 
 61. Melilli, supra note 17, at 487, 497 tbl.III-R (noting that 52.48% of the explanations 
involved group stereotypes); id. at 498 tbl.III-S (listing the group stereotypes employed and the 
frequency with which they were employed). 
 62. Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 60, at 1092. 
 63. Id. at 1092, 1096. The authors noted, for example, that overrepresentation of black 
males in prison and the finding that 32% of black men are likely to be imprisoned at least once 
during their lifetime (compared to much lower rates for white men, for example) suggest that 
“striking all persons with a relative who is or has been in prison will disproportionately exclude 
minority venirepersons.” Id. at 1097. 
 64. Hitchcock, supra note 2, at 1356; Paul H. Schwartz, Comment, Equal Protection in Jury 
Selection? The Implementation of Batson v. Kentucky in North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1533, 1577 
(1991). 
 65. Schwartz, supra note 64, at 1535. 
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deference to prosecutors’ proffered explanations.66 In the second paper, 
Amanda Hitchcock reached a similar conclusion based on her analysis of 
North Carolina Supreme Court rulings in all sixty-one capital cases involving 
a Batson claim between 1986 and 2005.67 The North Carolina court deferred 
to trial courts in almost every case “because Batson determinations often turn 
on the credibility of the prosecutor’s stated reasons for the objectionable 
challenges.”68 Hitchcock documents the court’s reluctance to rely upon 
statistical evidence to state a claim, its strict requirement of a complete 
match in side-by-side comparisons of jurors, and its lack of interest in claims 
based on disparate questioning.69 
While the Supreme Court has established a framework intended to limit 
the consideration of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges, the 
research reviewed here suggests that it continues to play a role. The study we 
present below provides further evidence that race not only weighs in jury 
selection, but weighs heavily. Moreover, its influence cannot be explained by 
ostensibly race-neutral factors that happen to correlate with race. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
The North Carolina RJA study follows the methodology used in the 
Philadelphia and Dallas County studies discussed above70 by including 
analysis of race-neutral factors about jurors that might bear on a party’s 
decision to strike. It improves on the Philadelphia study with more complete 
race and strike information.71 In addition, unlike any of the studies 
presented above, this study includes cases from multiple counties. In fact, it 
includes data about jury selection in more than one-half of the counties in 
North Carolina. 
We analyzed the role of race in strike decisions in two phases. First, we 
compared the rate at which prosecutors struck eligible black venire 
members to the rate at which they struck eligible venire members of other 
races. We then analyzed the role that characteristics other than race played 
in prosecutors’ decisions to strike or pass potential jurors, and whether any 
of those characteristics could account for racial disparities in who gets 
struck. 
A. STUDY POPULATION 
We examined jury selection in at least one proceeding for each inmate 
who resided on North Carolina’s death row as of July 1, 2010, for a total of 
 
 66. Id. at 1561–63. 
 67. Hitchcock, supra note 2, at 1328–30. 
 68. Id. at 1344. 
 69. Id. at 1345–47, 1349–50. 
 70. See supra text accompanying notes 51–59. 
 71. Baldus et al., supra note 51. 
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173 proceedings.72 For each proceeding, we sought to include every venire 
member who faced a peremptory challenge as part of jury selection. For the 
purposes of this study a “venire member” included anyone who was 
subjected to voir dire questioning and not excused for cause, including 
potential alternates. Each proceeding involved an average of 42.9 strike-
eligible venire members, producing a database of 7,421 strike decisions. Of 
these, 3,952 (53.3%) were women, and 3,469 (46.7%) were men. The 
venire members’ racial composition was as follows: white (6,057, 81.6%); 
black (1,211, 16.3%); Native American (79, 1.1%); Latino (21, 0.3%); 
mixed race (20, 0.3%); Asian (13, 0.2%); other (11, 0.1%); Pacific Islander 
(2, 0.03%); and unknown (7, 0.1%). 
B. DATA COLLECTION 
We created an electronic and paper case file for each proceeding in the 
study. The case file contains the primary data for every coding decision. The 
materials in the case file typically include some combination of juror seating 
charts, individual juror questionnaires, and attorneys’ or clerks’ notes. Each 
case file also includes an electronic copy of the jury selection transcript and 
documentation supporting each race coding decision. 
C. OVERVIEW OF DATABASE DEVELOPMENT 
Staff attorneys completed all coding and data entry at Michigan State 
University College of Law in East Lansing, Michigan, under the direct 
supervision of the primary investigators.73 Staff attorneys received detailed 
training on each step of the coding and data entry process. 
We collected information about the proceeding generally, including 
the number of peremptory challenges used by each side, and the name of 
the judge and attorneys involved in the proceeding, as well as basic 
demographic and procedural information specific to each venire member. 
Coding also required staff attorneys to determine strike eligibility for 
each potential juror. “Strike eligibility” refers to which party or parties had 
the chance to exercise a peremptory strike against a particular venire 
member. For instance, if the prosecution struck someone before the defense 
had a chance to question that person, that juror would be strike eligible to 
the prosecution only. Likewise, if a party had exhausted its peremptory 
challenges by the time it reached a potential juror, the failure to strike 
reveals nothing about how that party exercised its discretion. This 
 
 72. We included proceedings for all current death-row inmates to ensure the inclusion of 
every defendant with a potential claim under the Racial Justice Act. We also focused our analysis 
on defendants with an active death sentence because of the availability of data in such cases. In 
addition, we were confident that the decision making in 173 proceedings would provide a large 
enough sample for meaningful statistical analysis. We were able to include all but one 
proceeding, Jeffrey Duke’s 2001 trial, in which the case materials are unavailable. 
 73. A total of twelve staff attorneys and five law students worked on this project. 
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determination refines the analysis of strike decisions to examine only those 
instances in which that party actually had a choice to pass or strike a juror, 
and excludes those when the decision was out of the party’s hands.74 
In the second part of the study, staff attorneys used juror questionnaires 
(when available) and jury selection transcripts to code information relating 
to the following: (1) demographic characteristics (e.g., gender, marital 
status, employment, and educational background); (2) prior experiences 
with the legal system (e.g., prior jury service and experience as a criminal 
defendant or victim); and (3) attitudes about potentially relevant matters 
(e.g., ambivalence about the death penalty75 and skepticism about, or 
greater faith in, the credibility of police officers). 
D. RACE CODING 
In order to analyze potential racial disparities in peremptory strikes, it 
was necessary to identify the race of each venire member. Any potential 
findings about racial disparities in strike decisions would turn on the 
accuracy of this coding. Strike information was straightforward in that it 
could be extracted directly from the transcripts. As explained more fully 
below, race information was equally straightforward in a good number of 
cases. But for the cases that required the staff attorneys to look deeper to 
determine the race of venire members, we implemented a rigorous protocol 
to produce data in a way that is both reliable and transparent. 
We obtained information about potential jurors’ race from three 
sources. First, we collected juror questionnaires for many of the venire 
members in our study. These questionnaires almost always asked the venire 
member’s race, and the vast majority of respondents provided that 
information. We considered potential venire members’ self-reports of race 
to be highly reliable and were able to get this information from juror 
questionnaires for 62.3% (4,623/7,421) of the eligible venire members. 
For a second group of venire members, race was noted explicitly in the 
trial record. More than six percent (6.4%, 478/7,421) stated their race on 
 
 74. In one case (Gary Trull), the defense successfully challenged the prosecution’s 
exercise of a peremptory strike against a black venire member, and the court seated him as an 
alternate juror. Thus, although this venire member ultimately served on the jury, we 
nevertheless treated him as struck by the prosecution in the analysis. 
 75. A court could properly remove for cause a venire member who expressed 
unwillingness to impose the death penalty under any circumstances under Lockhart v. McCree, 
476 U.S. 162 (1986), Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), and Witt v. Wainwright, 470 
U.S. 1039 (1985), and thus such venire members are not included in our analysis. Sometimes, 
however, a venire member expressed reservations or ambivalence about the death penalty that 
fell short of outright opposition. Such a venire member would still be eligible to serve on the 
jury, but a prosecutor could reasonably base a decision to exercise a peremptory strike on this 
basis. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519–20 (1968). Accordingly, this is one of the 
many venire member characteristics we included in our analysis. 
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the record in a manner that appears in the voir dire transcript.76 Similarly, a 
court clerk’s chart noting the race of potential jurors that was officially made 
part of the trial record or a statement by an attorney on the record provided 
race information for a smaller percent of the venire members (0.5%, 
40/7,421).77 
Finally, for the remaining 30.6% (2,273/7,421) of venire members, we 
used electronic databases to find race information and record the race and 
source of race information. Staff attorneys used the North Carolina State 
Board of Elections website, LexisNexis “Locate a Person (Nationwide) 
Search Non-regulated,” LexisNexis Accurint, and the North Carolina 
Department of Motor Vehicles online database. Many of the case files 
included juror-summons lists with addresses, which allowed staff attorneys to 
match online records to the information about the potential juror with a 
high level of certainty. 
The primary investigators prepared a strict protocol for use of these 
websites for race coding and trained staff attorneys on that protocol in a 
half-day session. One objective of this protocol was to minimize the 
possibility of researcher bias. In addition, staff attorneys who searched for 
venire members’ information on electronic databases were (whenever 
possible) blind to strike decisions.78 
Throughout this process, we instructed staff attorneys to code a venire 
member’s race as “unknown” unless they were able to meet strict criteria 
ensuring that the person identified in the public record was in fact the 
venire member and not just someone with the same name.79 Staff attorneys 
were not to rely on a record containing information that was not wholly 
consistent with whatever information we had about a particular venire 
member. For instance, staff attorneys would not rely on a public record in 
which the person’s middle initial was inconsistent with that of the venire 
 
 76. In these instances, the judges asked potential jurors to state their race for the record. 
 77. Importantly, we did not rely on clerks’ or attorneys’ observations about potential 
jurors’ race unless incorporated into the record and thus subject to dispute if a party or the 
court objected to the classification. For instance, we considered reliable an attorney’s mention 
of a potential juror’s race during an argument regarding a Batson challenge with the 
assumption that the other party or the court would challenge that assessment if the attorney was 
mistaken. In contrast, we did not rely on a clerk’s notes about the race of potential jurors on a 
jury chart unless it was clear that the parties had a chance to review that document and 
challenge any perceived inaccuracies. 
 78. Staff attorneys seeking race information from public sources knew about strikes only 
when they had to turn to the transcript for information to help them find that venire member’s 
race. For instance, venire members often indicated during voir dire precisely where they lived 
and for how long. For cases lacking a summons list with addresses, this information was useful 
in public records searches where we lacked direct information about race. 
 79. For instance, staff attorneys were instructed to use information such as the venire 
member’s middle name or year of birth to link the venire member to records of someone with 
the same name. When at all in doubt, staff attorneys were instructed to code the venire 
member’s race as unknown. 
A6_GROSSO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/10/2012  7:31 PM 
1546 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1531 
member, unless they were able to document a name change to account for 
the discrepancy (for instance, a record that indicated that a venire member 
started using her maiden name as a middle name). If staff attorneys found 
someone with the same name as the venire member but with a different 
address, they were to use that record only if they could trace the person’s 
address back to that of the venire member. Staff attorneys saved an 
electronic copy of all documents used to make race determinations.80 
Because of the importance of the race coding, we conducted a 
reliability study on this methodology. Staff attorneys and law students used 
public records to code race for 1,897 venire members for whom we also had 
juror questionnaires reporting race or express designations of race in a voir 
dire transcript.81 
We then compared the data from public records to the presumably 
more reliable self-reported data in the jury questionnaires. Staff attorneys 
using public records were unable to determine a venire member’s race to 
the level of reliability required by the study protocol in 242 of 1,897 cases 
(12.8%).82 In the remaining 1,655 cases, the race extracted from the public 
records matched that taken from the presumably more reliable sources for 
97.9% of the venire members. This suggests that the method we used is 
highly reliable. 
 
 80. For instance, if a staff attorney identified the race of a venire member through the 
North Carolina Board of Elections website, he or she would save the record with the venire 
member’s race designation (usually as an Adobe Acrobat file but sometimes as a screen shot). If 
the staff attorney relied upon an address provided in the juror-summons list to identify a venire 
member had moved since the time of the trial, the staff attorney would also save records of the 
venire member’s change of addresses over the years. This information was often available in the 
Lexis-Nexis Locate a Person Database, which allowed the staff attorney to trace the venire 
member’s address from the juror-summons list to his or her current address reflected in the 
North Carolina Board of Elections website. For each step in the process linking current 
information about each venire member to information recorded at the time of the trial, staff 
attorneys saved a copy of the electronic record. 
 81. The staff attorneys did not have access to the questionnaires or voir dire transcripts 
when they conducted the public-records research. 
 82. We instructed staff attorneys to code a venire member’s race as unknown unless they 
could rule out the possibility that the record on which they were relying referred to someone 
besides the venire member. In cases where we had juror summons lists with addresses, a staff 
attorney usually had no trouble identifying the venire member from two people with the same 
name. Lacking specific identifying information, however, staff attorneys were sometimes unable 
to meet the strict criteria for extracting race. We expected that this method of extracting data 
on race would lead to a moderate amount of missing data. 
In the full study, we expended additional efforts to find the missing data. In most 
instances, our staff attorneys reviewed transcripts more closely to gather identifying information 
that allowed them to link the venire members to the appropriate public records. For example, 
venire members often stated in voir dire where they lived and worked. This additional 
information often allowed staff attorneys to narrow down public records for people with the 
same name even when we lacked a juror-summons list. 
Staff attorneys and law students did not expend this level of effort in tracking down race 
through public-record databases solely for the reliability check. 
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The methods described in this section allowed us to document race for 
all but 7 of the 7,421 eligible venire members in our study. In other words, 
our database includes race information for 99.9% of the eligible venire 
members, as well as the source of that information for each venire member. 
E. CODING RACE-NEUTRAL CONTROL VARIABLES (DESCRIPTIVE INFORMATION) 
Strike and race information allows for the calculation of strike rates by 
race. To account for other factors that might bear on the decision to strike, 
more detailed information about individual venire members must be 
considered. Thus, in addition to basic demographic information about each 
eligible venire member, we coded more detailed information on 
approximately sixty-five variables for a random sample of venire members. 
We sought to identify the variables that consistently and reliably predicted 
whether the state would strike or pass a potential juror. Appendix A provides 
a partial list of our race-neutral control variables. These variables document 
information such as views on the death penalty; education, marital, and 
employment status; religious affiliation; and experience with crime. 
Because this process is labor intensive,83 we drew a random sample of 
venire members from the database84 and coded detailed descriptive 
information for almost a quarter of the venire members in the database 
(1,753/7,421).85 
The following sections of this Article present the research in increasing 
levels of analytical complexity. We start with the unadjusted racial disparities 
in prosecutorial strikes, and then present disparities controlling, one at a 
time, for potentially relevant race-neutral variables. Finally, we present the 
disparities that emerge via fully controlled logistic regression analysis of a 
randomly selected sample of a quarter of the study population for whom we 
coded detailed individual-level information. 
 
 83. We instituted procedures for double coding of descriptive information to ensure 
accuracy and intercoder reliability. 
 84. We used the SPSS random-select function to draw the sample. The demographic 
profile of the random sample strongly resembled that of the complete study population. Of 
these 1,753 jurors, 1,749 were eligible to be struck by the state. We determined the race of all 
but two jurors (83.6% non-black (1,465), 16.3% black (286), and 0.1% missing (2)). These 
percentages mirror those in the full sample (83.6% non-black (6,203), 16.3% black (1,211), 
and 0.1% missing (7)). The random sample also reflects the relative proportions of men and 
women: The smaller sample included 51.9% women (910) and 48.1% men (843); the full data 
set included 53.3% women (3,952) and 46.7% men (3,469). 
 85. A few of the venire members who were randomly selected to be included in the sample 
could not be coded due to the poor quality or unavailability of the case materials. The 
transcript for the case of Wayne Laws was too faded to be made searchable, and no venire 
members were coded for descriptive information. No transcript was available in the more 
recent case of Michael Ryan. 
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F. STATEWIDE UNADJUSTED PROSECUTORIAL STRIKE PATTERNS 
The statewide database includes information about 7,421 venire 
members. Of those, 7,400 (99.7%) were eligible to be struck by the state. 
We analyzed prosecutorial-strike patterns using only those venire members 
who were eligible to be struck by the state. Among strike-eligible venire 
members, the overwhelming majority were either white (6,039, 81.6%) or 
black (1,208, 16.3%); just 2.0% (153) were other races. As noted above, we 
are missing race information for 7 (0.1%) venire members. 
Prosecutors exercised peremptory challenges at a significantly higher 
rate against black venire members than against all other venire members. As 
seen in Table 1, across all strike-eligible venire members in the study, 
prosecutors struck 52.6% (636/1,208) of eligible black venire members, 
compared to only 25.7% (1,592/6,185) of all other eligible venire 
members.86 
In addition, Table 2 shows that the average rate per case at which 
prosecutors struck eligible black venire members is significantly higher than 
the rate at which they struck other eligible venire members.87 Of the 166 
cases that included at least one eligible black venire member, prosecutors 
struck an average of 56.0% of eligible black venire members, compared to 





 86. See infra Table 1. This difference is statistically significant, p < .001; put differently, 
there is less than a one in one thousand chance that we would observe a disparity of this 
magnitude if the jury selection process were actually race neutral. Several different chi-squared 
tests (Pearson Chi-Squared, Continuity Correction, Likelihood Ratio, Fischer’s Exact Test, and 
Linear-by-Linear Association) were used to calculate the p-values, and the results were 
consistent regardless of the test used. 
 87. The analyses presented in Tables 1 and 2 are very similar, but differ in their unit of 
analysis. Table 1 shows strikes against all venire members in the study pooled across cases 
(7,400 strike eligible venire members across 173 cases). Table 2 compares the strike rates 
calculated per case. Thus, only those cases with at least one eligible black venire member (166) 
were included, and each case represents one data point. We present both ways of calculating 
these disparities to demonstrate that the effect is robust and does not depend on which method 
is used. 
 88. See infra Table 2. This difference is statistically significant, p < .001. When we exclude 
those venire members whose race we coded from public records, the pattern is substantially the 
same: Of 139 cases, prosecutors struck an average of 55.7% of eligible black venire members 
compared to only 22.1% of all other eligible venire members. This difference is statistically 
significant, p < .001. This suggests that the patterns we observed are not skewed in some way by 
the source of information about potential jurors’ race. 
The disparities between mean prosecutorial strike rates against eligible black venire 
members versus those of other races are consistent across time: 57.4% versus 25.9%, p < .001 
(1990–1994, forty-two cases); 54.7% versus 24.0%, p < .001 (1995–1999, eighty cases); 57.2% 
versus 25.0%, p < .001 (2000–04, twenty-nine cases); and 56.4% versus 25.4%, p < .01 (2005–
2010, fifteen cases). 
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TABLE 1 
Statewide Prosecutorial Peremptory Strike Patterns  
(Strikes against venire members aggregated across cases) 




































*Chi-squared tests (Pearson Chi-Squared, Continuity Correction, Likelihood Ratio, 
Fischer’s Exact Test, and Linear-by-Linear Association) indicate that these 
differences in strike rates are significant at p < .001. 
 
TABLE 2 
Statewide Average Rates of State Strikes  
(Strike rates calculated in individual cases and averaged across cases) 
  A B 
  Average Strike Rate Number of Cases 
Averaged  
1. Strike Rates Against Black 
Qualified Venire Members 
56.0% 
(SD = 24.6%) 
166 
2. Strike Rates Against All 
Other Qualified Venire 
Members 
24.8% 
(SD = 7.0%) 
166 
*A paired-sample t-test indicates that this difference in strike rates is significant at 
p < .001. 
 
As seen in Table 3, disparities were even greater in cases involving black 
defendants. In cases with non-black defendants, the average strike rate was 
51.4% against black venire members and 26.8% against all other venire 
members.89 In cases with black defendants, the average strike rate was 60.0% 
against black venire members and 23.1% against other venire members.90 
 
 89. See infra Table 3. Out of 166 cases with black eligible venire members, ninety involved 
black defendants and seventy-six involved defendants of other races. 
 90. See infra Table 3. 
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The difference in the magnitude of the disparity between black and other 
defendants is statistically significant.91 In other words, although state strike 
rates are always higher against black venire members than against other 




Disparities in Strike Patterns by Race of Defendant  
(Strike rates calculated in individual cases and averaged across cases) 















(SD = 30.0%) 
90 
2. All Other Qualified 
Venire Members 
23.1% 






(SD = 25.8%) 
76 
4. All Other Qualified 
Venire Members 
26.8% 
(SD = 6.6%) 
*Analysis of variance (F-test) indicates that this difference between the disparities in 
strike rates by race of defendant is significant at p < .03. 
IV. THE EFFECT OF RACE AFTER CONTROLLING FOR VENIRE MEMBERS’ 
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS ON THE EXERCISE OF PEREMPTORY STRIKES 
The disparate strike rates in the first stage of the analysis are compelling 
evidence of racial discrimination in jury selection, but testing alternative 
explanations for the observed disparities provides a more complete picture. 
For instance, Baldus and colleagues found that jurors who expressed 
concern about imposing the death penalty faced markedly higher odds of 
being struck by the prosecution.92 Public opinion research indicates that 
attitudes about the death penalty differ across racial groups.93 By collecting 
 
 91. Note, however, that we were unable to find a statistically significant effect of 
defendant’s race on the likelihood that a black potential juror would be struck in a fully 
controlled model. 
 92. Baldus et al., supra note 51. 
 93. For example, a 2003 Gallup poll of 1,017 randomly sampled adults found that 67% of 
white respondents supported the death penalty compared to only 39% of African American 
respondents. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL 
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and controlling for information about a wide variety of juror characteristics, 
we can examine the possibility that variables that happen to correlate with 
race (rather than race itself) account for the observed disparities.94 
We first controlled for race-neutral variables by analyzing strike 
disparities within subsets of the study population. For example, we excluded 
all of the venire members who expressed any ambivalence about the death 
penalty and then analyzed the strike patterns for the remaining venire 
members. Because none of the remaining venire members expressed 
ambivalence about the death penalty, any racial disparity in strike patterns 
we observed could not be attributable to the possibility that relevant 
attitudes vary along racial lines. We looked at five different subsets in this 
manner, removing (1) venire members who expressed any reservations 
about the death penalty, (2) unemployed venire members, (3) venire 
members who had been accused of a crime or had a close relative accused of 
a crime, (4) venire members who knew any trial participant, and finally, (5) 
all venire members with any one of the first four characteristics. The 
disparities identified through the unadjusted analysis persisted in each and 














JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003, at 146, tbl.2.52, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/ 
pdf/section2.pdf. 
 94. Our analysis did not include any potential jurors removed for cause. As a result, any 
characteristic that would make someone ineligible to serve on a death penalty jury (such as 
categorical opposition to the death penalty) has already been “controlled for” in that people 
with these characteristics are not included in the analysis. 
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TABLE 4 
Strike Patterns when State-Strike Eligible Venire Members with Potentially 
Explanatory Variables Are Removed from Equation 

































































*Chi-squared tests (Pearson Chi-Squared, Continuity Correction, Likelihood Ratio, 
Fischer’s Exact Test, and Linear-by-Linear Association) were used to calculate the p-
values. 
 
The disparities in prosecutorial strike rates against eligible black venire 
members persist even when other characteristics one might expect to bear 
on the decision to strike are removed from the equation. Table 4 provides a 
simple way of comparing apples to apples. However, the decision to strike or 
pass a potential juror can turn on a number of factors in isolation or 
combination. In the following section, we provide the results of a fully 
controlled logistic regression model, taking into account a number of 
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potentially relevant factors to examine whether the racial disparities can be 
explained by some combination of race-neutral factors. 
As noted above, we collected individual-level descriptive information for 
a significant randomly selected portion (1,753/7,421) of the venire 
members in the study. Even after controlling for other factors potentially 
relevant to jury selection, a black venire member had 2.48 times the odds of 
being struck by the state as did a venire member of another race.95 In other 
words, while many factors one might expect to bear on the likelihood of 
being struck did matter, none—alone or in combination—accounts for the 
disproportionately high strike rates against qualified black venire 
members.96 
The coding process described above produced close to sixty-five 
variables potentially relevant to whether a venire member was struck or 
passed. We sought to identify the variables that consistently and reliably 
predicted whether the state would strike or pass a potential juror. The 
resulting model combines those factors to distinguish venire members based 
on how objectionable (or desirable) they were to prosecutors as potential 
jurors. 
Using the Logistic Regression command in SPSS, we started the analysis 
with a simple model using only venire members’ race97 and tested each 
candidate control variable both individually and in small groups. This 
process allowed us to identify the most important control variables for the 
decision to strike or pass an eligible venire member. This process produced 
about twenty-five variables that bore a significant relation (either in isolation 
 
 95. We used a logistic regression model with the dependent variable that the strike-eligible 
venire member was struck or passed on by the state. A few words are in order about the choice 
of this model in lieu of a multilevel model. One assumption of logistic regression is that the 
data are independent. That assumption comes into question in this context, as a party’s 
decision to use one of its strikes is likely to be affected by who else is in the pool. This can 
present a problem in that it might increase the risk of Type I error; that is, it could increase the 
chances that the researcher will improperly find a result statistically significant. One way to 
gauge whether a particular dataset presents such a risk is to look at interclass correlations. If 
subjects (i.e., venire members) nested within settings (i.e., trials) are in fact more similar to 
each other than are subjects between settings, the researcher should use a multilevel model. We 
examined the interclass correlations for the 173 cases in this study and found a negative 
interclass correlation. That means that venire members within a case were no more alike as to 
the outcome of interest (struck or passed) than were venire members between cases. In fact, 
that the interclass correlation was negative suggests that the results of the logistic regression 
analysis are likely conservative. For this reason, using a multilevel model was unnecessary and a 
traditional logistic regression model was appropriate. See David A. Kenny, Deborah A. Kashy & 
Niall Bolger, Data Analysis in Social Psychology, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 237 
(Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske & Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 1998). 
 96. See infra Table 5. 
 97. Including the race variable in this model helps to identify which variables are 
potentially significant in the complete model independent of race. To get the clearest picture 
possible, we also tested potential control variables without including race in the model, but this 
did not produce a different list of potential control variables. 
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or in combination) to the odds of being struck. We then tested these 
variables in various combinations, both by forcing them into the model and 
by allowing the computer program to assess which of the candidate variables 
provided the best fitting model. Through this process, we were able to build 
a model estimating the effects of various venire member characteristics on 
strike decisions. 
Table 5 presents the final logistic regression model for prosecutorial 
strike decisions. A venire member is coded “1” if struck by the state and “0” 
if strike-eligible but not struck. The “Black” variable in Row 2 shows the 
regression coefficient, the standard error of that estimated coefficient, the 
odds ratio, the confidence interval for that odds ratio, and the p-value for 
the effect that being black has on the odds of being struck by the state. This 
model estimates that after controlling for several other race-neutral factors, 
black venire members face odds of being struck by the state that were 2.48 
times those faced by all other venire members.98 
The results of the logistic regression model are consistent with the 
unadjusted disparities we observed looking simply at the relative strike rates 
against black and other venire members. None of the factors we controlled 
for in the regression analysis eliminated the effect of race in jury selection. 
While we found many non-racial factors that were highly relevant to the 
decision to strike, none was so closely associated with race or so frequent 
that it could serve as an alternative explanation of the racial disparities. Note 
that throughout the process of building this model, we found no factor or 
combination of factors that rendered the effect of race non-significant. In 
other words, the statistically significant influence of race on the odds of 
being struck was robust; its predictive power did not depend on the 
inclusion or exclusion of any particular variable or variables in the model.99 
A black venire member was still more than twice as likely (2.48 to 1) to be 
struck by the state even when other relevant characteristics were held 
constant. 
 
 98. p < .001. See infra Table 5. 
 99. If we were missing data for an individual juror regarding any of the variables under 
analysis, this model excluded that juror from the analysis completely (even though we have data 
about that juror for some of the other variables). To determine whether exclusion of these 
cases with missing data skewed the model, we used a method known as multiple imputation. See 
DONALD B. RUBIN, MULTIPLE IMPUTATION FOR NONRESPONSE IN SURVEYS 2 (1987); J.L. SCHAFER, 
ANALYSIS OF INCOMPLETE MULTIVARIATE DATA 104–05 (1997). This method allows us to use the 
information we do have about a juror to impute a value for the missing variable using what we 
know about other jurors for whom we have complete information on the variable in question. 
We then conducted another logistic regression analysis using these data (original data 
supplemented by imputed values for the missing). This model produced estimates that were 
very close to the estimates presented in Table 5, in which we used only jurors for whom we have 
complete information. This suggests that the information we were missing about venire 
members was missing randomly, and thus did not skew the analysis. 
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This finding is notable because it speaks to the concern that we have 
failed to account for other race-neutral factors that might explain the 
disparity. For instance, while we have accounted for many race-neutral 
factors that bear on jury selection, we cannot account for a venire member’s 
physical appearance or body language—factors litigators often cite as 
relevant to their decision to strike.100 But factors like these should generally 
be unrelated to the race of the venire member. Moreover, even if these 
factors were associated more with some racial groups than others, that 
association would have to be very strong and the factor quite frequent to 
explain the observed racial disparities. 
  
 
 100. See, e.g., Ben Rubinowitz & Evan Torgan, Jury Selection: Time Constraints and Weaknesses 
in Cases, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 29, 2007, at 8 (emphasizing the importance of a “juror's demeanor 
[and] ability to maintain eye contact” in assessing potential bias); Jeff Strange, Jury Selection in 
30 Minutes or Less, PROSECUTOR (Tex. Dist. & Cnty. Atty’s Ass’n, Austin, Tex.). Sept.–Oct. 2009, 
available at http://www.tdcaa.com/node/5267 (emphasizing the importance of noting how a 
potential juror dresses and interacts with other members of the panel to assess whether they are 
“conformists who accept societal norms and expect others to do the same”). 
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TABLE 5 
Statewide Fully Controlled Logistic Regression Model 









1. Intercept  -1.714 0.137 0.16  <.001 






















would impose a 
hardship 
1.094 0.31 2.99 1.61, 5.54 <.01 
7. Homemaker 
Venire member is 




Venire member or 
close other works 
in law 
enforcement 
-0.466 0.19 0.63 0.44, 0.90 <.02 
9. JKnewD 





2.156 0.66 8.63 
2.37, 
31.41 <.01 
10. JKnewW Venire member 
knew a witness 





knew one of the 
attorneys in the 
case 





expresses view that 
suggests view 




right not to testify)





went to graduate 
school 




Venire member is 
22 or younger 0.920 0.40 2.51 
1.14, 
5.55 <.03 
R2 = .32 
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V. CONCLUSION 
How North Carolina courts interpret and apply the RJA to claims of 
racial bias in jury selection is an open question pending the outcome of 
cases currently in litigation.101 In the past, North Carolina trial courts have 
not been especially willing to sustain Batson objections, and reviewing courts 
have shown almost complete deference to those rulings.102 The RJA’s 
express authorization to look at patterns that emerge in strike decisions 
across cases shifts the focus from a question of a particular prosecutor’s 
credibility in a particular case to what the data tell us about what drives strike 
decisions generally. Justifications for strike decisions that seem plausible in 
the limited context of a single case—even with the aid of side-by-side 
comparisons of struck and unstruck jurors authorized by Miller-El v. Dretke—
might not hold up when the universe of potential comparators expands to 
include jury selection in other cases.103 
  
 
 101. The study presented in this Article was the focus of a two-and-a-half week hearing in 
Cumberland County, North Carolina in early 2012. Death row inmate Marcus Robinson’s RJA 
claim as to racial disparities in prosecutors’ use of peremptory strikes in capital jury selection 
was the first such claim to go to a hearing. On April 20, 2012, the trial court issued its ruling 
that race had been a significant factor in the state’s decision to exercise peremptory strikes, 
finding the analyses presented here “to be a valid, highly reliable, statistical study of jury 
selection practices in North Carolina capital cases between 1990 and 2010.” Order Granting 
Motion for Appropriate Relief at 45, State v. Robinson, No. 91 CRS 23143 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 
20, 2012), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/marcus_robinson_order.pdf. The 
defendant’s death sentence was vacated, and he was resentenced to life in prison without the 
possibility of parole.  
 102. See Amanda S. Hitchcock, Recent Development, “Deference Does Not by Definition Preclude 
Relief”: The Impact of Miller-El v. Dretke on Batson Review in North Carolina Capital Appeals, 84 
N.C. L. REV. 1328 (2006) (reviewing North Carolina Supreme Court’s highly deferential 
approach to reviewing Batson claims in capital cases). 
 103. See Sommers & Norton, supra note 31, at 269 (finding evidence of racial bias in mock 
jury selection experiment but noting that “[w]e observed bias against Black venire members 
only when examining decisions made by several participants; indeed, for any given participant, 
we are unable to determine whether the peremptory was influenced by race or whether the 
justification provided was valid”). 
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APPENDIX A 
PARTIAL LIST OF VARIABLES FROM DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT 
 
Part A. General Codes 
Variable Name Label 
DName Defendant’s name 
VM_Name Juror’s name 
VM_Race Juror’s race 
SourceRace Source of race information (e.g., juror 
questionnaire, public record) 
StrikeState StrikeState = 1 if state used a peremptory strike 
against the juror (all else = 0) 
StrikeDef StrikeDef = 1 if defense used a peremptory strike 
against the juror (all else = 0) 
Status Juror’s ultimate status (e.g., struck, seated as an 
alternate juror) 
Gender 0 = Female; 1 = Male 
Age Juror’s age in years 
Marital Juror’s marital status (e.g., married, widowed, 
single) 
Children 0 = No children; 1 = Children 
ReligiousOrg 1 = Belongs to a religious organization; 0 = all else 
Education Juror’s education level (e.g., high school graduate, 
attended graduate school) 
Military 1 = Served in military; 0 = all else 
Employment See below for a portion of the coding appendix used 
to code jurors’ employment 
SpouseEmployment Employment of married jurors’ spouses (same codes 
used for jurors’ employment) 
Descriptives 
Up to 10 codes used to capture experiences and 
attitudes expressed in jury selection. See below for a 
partial list of codes. 
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Part B. Employment Codes  
(excluding subparts capturing different types of jobs within those listed as 
examples) 
Code Category Examples 
10 Management & 
Professional 
Management and business; computers; 
legal; medical; engineering 
20 Sales and Office Occupations 
Sales; office and administrative support 
30 
Farming, Fishing, and 
Forestry  
 
40 Service  Healthcare support; fire fighting; law 
enforcement; food preparation 










80 Outside of Labor Force  Student; retired; homemaker; 
unemployed 
 
Part C. Codes for Juror Characteristics  
(excluding subparts capturing more detailed juror characteristics) 
Code Category Examples 
100 Hardship Emotional difficulty; 
caretaking obligation 
300 Juror/Friend/Family Was Victim of 
Crime 
 
400 Juror/Friend/Family Was Accused of Criminal Activity 
 
700 
Admitted Bias or Other Reason S/he 
Could Not Be Fair 
Premature opinion; 
admitted bias  
800 
Expressed View Contrary to Applicable 
Law, Not Including Death 
Qualification 
Difficulty presuming 
innocence; draws adverse 
inferences from failure to 
testify 
900 Prior Familiarity with Parties Knows parties or attorneys 
1200 Moral or Religious Reservations about Imposing the Death Penalty 
Ambivalence about death 
penalty (short of refusal to 
impose under any 
circumstances) 
 
